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ABSTRACT Inter-domain routing security is of critical importance to the Internet since it prevents unwanted
traffic redirections. The current system is based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), a centralized repository
of digital certificates. However, the inherent centralization of such design creates tensions between its partici-
pants and hinders its deployment. In addition, some technical drawbacks of PKIs delay widespread adoption.
In this paper we present IPchain, a blockchain to store the allocations and delegations of IP addresses. IPchain
leverages blockchains’ properties to decentralize trust among its participants, with the final goal of providing
flexible trust models that adapt better to the ever-changing geopolitical landscape. Moreover, we argue that
Proof of Stake is a suitable consensus algorithm for IPchain due to the unique incentive structure of this use-
case, and that blockchains offer relevant technical advantages when compared to existing systems, such as
simplified management. In order to show its feasibility and suitability, we have implemented and evaluated
IPchain’s performance and scalability storing around 350k IP prefixes in a 2.5 GB chain.
INDEX TERMS Blockchain, decentralization, inter-domain routing, IP prefixes, IP networks, Proof of
Stake.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inter-domain routing security is a pressing issue in today’s
Internet. In a nutshell, inter-domain routing security encom-
passes the correct announcement and propagation of IP pre-
fixes across the Autonomous Systems (AS) that conform
the Internet. Currently, the protocol that communicates these
announcements is BGP (Border Gateway Protocol, RFC
4271). BGP allows ISPs and other Internet companies to
announce routes, i.e. how to reach a specific destination. BGP
security is typically based on manual and careful configu-
ration via out-of-band mechanisms where network operators
communicate each other which prefixes to announce. Hence,
an accidental misconfiguration or a malicious attacker con-
trolling a BGP router can disrupt normal Internet routing [1].
This can lead to denial of Internet services, traffic redirection,
data leaks, etc.
One of the most relevant attacks to the Inter-domain rout-
ing infrastructure is known as prefix hijacking. Since BGP
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Noor Zaman .
messages are not authenticated, it is easy to perform a BGP
hijack by forging BGP announcements and propagating them
to neighboring ASes. There is a long history of prefix hijacks
on the Internet. As an example of this, in 2008 the Pak-
istani government ordered national ISPs to censor YouTube.
Due to a configuration error, they attracted large portions of
non-Pakistani YouTube traffic which resulted in the service
being down during 2 hours worldwide [2].
Given the severity of these attacks, the IETF (Internet Engi-
neering Task Force) has designed a solution to Inter-domain
routing security by means of the RPKI (Resource Public
Key Infrastructure, RFC 6480), a PKI repository to record
the legitimate owners of IP prefixes, AS numbers and ROAs
(Route Origin Authorization, a certificate to allow an AS
to announce an IP prefix). Despite these efforts, RPKI
deployment is slower than expected: only ∼14% of the
total /24 IPv4 address blocks owned by the five Internet
Registries are protected by the RPKI (fig. 1).
There are several reasons that contribute to this lim-
ited deployment, related to technical issues but also to
policy aspects. By policy aspects we refer to RPKI’s
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FIGURE 1. Amount of RIPE’s IPv4 address space covered by ROAs,
in /24 units. Of the five Registries, RIPE is the one with highest RPKI
adoption [3].
inherent centralization, that leaves ultimate control of Inter-
net routing to the RPKI Certification Authorities (CAs),
in this case the five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) [4].
This centralized security model does not align well with the
current situation of the Internet, which is at a crossroads with
different competing visions on how it should be [5], and risks
splintering into isolated networks known as splinternet [6].
In other words, we face a dilemma between centralization and
decentralization.
On the technical side, the RPKI presents various obstacles
to widespread deployment: management complexity (PKIs
are cumbersome to manage, e.g. when performing a key
refresh), implementation challenges [7], and concerns on
transparency [8]. In addition, deploying these extensions
is not trivial and requires trained staff [9] and financial
investment.
In the light of this situation, we propose securing
Inter-domain routing by storing IP address allocation data
in a blockchain. Thanks to its decentralized nature, we can
distribute trust among all of its participants (i.e. all the owners
of IP addresses). This way, each entity maintains its indepen-
dence but at the same time they have a common framework
to agree on routing security, thereby reducing the incentives
to isolate parts of it. In addition, we can create flexible
trust models that capture the complexities of geopolitics and
replace single points of control (CAs) with global agreement
(blockchain consensus algorithms).
Moreover, with a blockchain we can address the aforemen-
tioned technical drawbacks: (i) simplify management, espe-
cially regarding common PKI operations such as key rollover,
(ii) offer auditability: blockchain’s append-only ledger can
detect possible configuration errors even before a modifica-
tion [10], and (iii) create a consistent vision of the state that
does not depend on additional systems (i.e. PKI Certificate
Revocation Lists, CRLs), because all the required operations
can be embedded in the blockchain.
In this paper we present IPchain, a blockchain to store
IP address allocation and delegation data. The underlying
argument is that IP addresses are very similar to crypto-coins,
FIGURE 2. IP address allocation hierarchy.
e.g. they are unique or can be divided into smaller amounts.
Just like in Bitcoin users send money, participants in IPchain
can transfer IP addresses. For example, an ISP can store its IP
prefixes in the chain, along with the originating AS number.
Then, other ISPs can use this data to verify the origin of BGP
messages associated with these prefixes.
We have developed a prototype to assess the feasibility
of our proposal, focusing on scalability and performance.
Such prototype follows the blockchain transaction paradigm
to allocate and delegate IP prefixes. We leverage a Proof of
Stake consensus algorithm, i.e. select randomly the signer of
the next block among all participants, weighted by their num-
ber of IP addresses. Finally, we performed an experimental
evaluation: we converted the IP prefixes of the Internet Reg-
istries into blockchain transactions and stored approximately
70% of them in a chain of 2.5 GB.
This paper is an extension of an earlier version that was pre-
sented in a conference [11]. Specifically, we have introduced
a new design for the Proof of Stake algorithm (sec. VI-A),
new evaluation metrics for such algorithm (sec. VII), an anal-
ysis of the feasibility of a PoS monopoly in real life
(sec. IV-C), and a long-term storage estimation (sec. VII-C).
II. BACKGROUND: IP ADDRESS ALLOCATION
AND RPKI ARCHITECTURE
The allocation of IP addresses follows a hierarchical scheme.
It is usually formed of three tiers (fig. 2): the Internet
Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), the Regional Inter-
net Registries (RIRs) and ISPs. Initially, IANA holds all
the address space, since it is charge of Internet numbers.
Then, it transfers large blocks of addresses to the RIRs (1).
Afterwards, the Registries delegate smaller blocks to their
customers, usually ISPs (2). Finally, ISPs can delegate blocks
to their customers (3). The procedure is equivalent for AS
numbers.
In the RPKI we find the same hierarchical structure with
digital certificates, which authenticate the allocation of IP
prefixes and AS numbers (fig. 3). In summary, there are two
types of certificates: Resource Certificates (RC) and Route
Origin Authorizations (ROA). RCs bind IP prefixes or AS
numbers to a public key (1), and ROAs specify which AS
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FIGURE 3. Sample RPKI certificate hierarchy.
number can advertise a particular IP prefix (3). It is also
possible to sub-allocate resources to other entities (2) or issue
more than one ROA (4).
This way, network operators download the certificates and
use them to verify BGP announcements. If the (IP prefix,
AS number) pair in the BGP message does not match the
corresponding certificate in the RPKI, the announcement is
considered invalid.
In this architecture, trust is centralized in the five RIRs,
who act as CAs and own the Trust Anchor used to validate all
downstream certificates.
III. WHY BLOCKCHAIN?
In this section we discuss the advantages provided by a
blockchain when compared to the RPKI. We focus both
on technical and policy benefits. By policy we refer to the
possibility of modifying current trust architectures in order
to better align the interests of all parties.
A. TECHNICAL ADVANTAGES
Consistent vision of the state: Both in Bitcoin and the RPKI,
we need a mechanism to update the state and notify all
participants, so that all of them agree on the same data.
While the RPKI makes use of specific protocols to update
state (e.g. RFC 8181 or Certificate Revocation Lists), in a
blockchain this can be directly encoded in its transactions.
Auditability: Since blockchain transactions cannot be
eliminated, we can easily detect updates, for example, when
a new ROA is issued for the same IP address. Moreover,
this persistence prevents unwanted deletions that could affect
other users [10]. Even though we can build auditability sys-
tems for PKIs1, a blockchain has this feature out of the box.
Simplified management: common RPKI operations, such
as key refresh or certificate revocation are complex and
require multiple steps or dedicated subsystems. On the other
hand, a blockchain makes those operations much more sim-
ple, usually it is only necessary to add a new transaction.
In a PKI, when we perform a key rollover we have to re-sign
1https://datatracker.ietf.org/wg/trans/about/
all downstream certificates2, and if we want to revoke cer-
tificates we need manifests and CRLs. As we said, in a
blockchain we can perform these two operations with a new
transaction.
Privacy: Blockchain transactions are not linked to the
user’s identity, just to a public key. It is worth noting that
the RPKI also offers privacy, because its certificates do not
contain identity information.
B. POLICY ADVANTAGES
The main benefit of using blockchain in our scenario is the
decentralization of trust. As mentioned earlier, RPKI users
(typically ISPs) have to trust the five RPKI CAs (one for each
RIR), which act as central points of trust, and can arbitrarily
revoke any downstream certificate [4]. This situation can be
uncomfortable for ISPs, because IP prefixes are a key asset for
most of them (their connectivity is based on proper attribution
of IP addresses).
On the contrary, with a blockchain we can tackle these con-
cerns, because their inherent decentralization leaves control
of resources to the owner of the public-private key pair. Thus,
in a blockchain we can effectively shift the power from CAs
to the users, so that after the prefix allocation, users do not
depend anymore on the actions of the CA.
Moreover, due to the fact that we can enforce complex
policies inside a blockchain, it is possible to define flexible
trust schemes between RIRs and users (c.f. section V-E),
i.e. a middle ground between complete centralization and
decentralization.
IV. WHICH CONSENSUS ALGORITHM?
Consensus algorithms are probably the most important build-
ing block of a blockchain. This section details the motivations
when deciding which one to use for the use-case of securing
IP address allocation and delegation.
A. PROOF OF WORK
In Proof of Work (PoW), nodes in the blockchain have
to solve a complex mathematical problem to add a block,
thus requiring some computational effort. The definitive
chain is the one with most computing power spent to
create.
Despite its widespread usage, PoW is not suitable for our
use case. The main reason is that the security of a PoW chain
is directly linked to computing power. In other words, if we
can accumulate enough computing power, we can rewrite the
blockchain with false data (e.g., incorrect delegations of IP
addresses). This is very expensive in blockchains accounting
for millions of participants (like in Bitcoin or Ethereum),
due to the large amount of computing power powering them.
However, in our situation this kind of attack is feasible:
consider that the current number of Autonomous Systems in
the Internet is only around 65k [12].
2RFC 6489 is specifically devoted to key rollover in the RPKI.
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B. PROOF OF STAKE FOR IP PREFIX
ALLOCATION AND DELEGATION
In a Proof of Stake (PoS [13]) blockchain, participants with
more assets/coins are more likely to add blocks. Like in PoW,
the algorithm randomly selects one participant to add a block,
but it takes into account emphhow many coins each user has.
The underlying idea is that users with more coins (stake) have
an incentive to contribute in the chain because they are its
primary users.
Taking into consideration these particularities, we advocate
that PoS is the most suitable option for our use-case, due to
three key reasons.
First, in PoS only blockchain users can make modifi-
cations, i.e. we don’t depend on external actors and their
computing power. This is of paramount importance in our
scenario, because users that own a large quantity of IP address
will have higher chance to add blocks. Usually, such par-
ticipants also profit from an Internet that operates properly,
so they have a clear motivation to keep its normal operation.
In other words, blockchain users do not have any incentive
to forge information because they would suffer the conse-
quences: an insecure Internet [11].
Second, with a PoS algorithm we can reduce the risk of
takeover, i.e. buying a large amount of assets in order to
accumulate enough stake to rewrite the blockchain. In our
context, this means buying a large amount of IP prefixes from
other participants. However, it is not clear that an attacker
may be able to perform such attack, because the other users
lack a clear reason to sell their IP addresses: as we mentioned
previously, they are an important economical asset for most
ISPs.
And third, with a PoS algorithm we benefit from a low
computational cost and we don’t need special hardware.
These two facts lower the entry barrier for new participants
in the blockchain.
C. POS RESISTANCE TO MONOPOLIES
Nevertheless, PoS presents a fundamental weakness: monop-
olies. If a participant controls half or more of the assets,
it will eventually take control of the blockchain. In order to
determine if this could happen in a chain for IP addresses,
we have calculated how many addresses own the five RIRs
and selected countries or political unions. Fig. 4 presents
the percentage of IPv4 addresses of each, derived from IP
to AS mappings3 and CAIDA AS to organization mappings.
As the figure shows, no country or RIR owns more than 40%
of addresses, rendering PoS resistant to monopolies in this
scenario (we are assuming that a collusion of two or more of
the presented entities is highly unlikely). A similar analysis
focusing on individual companies reveals that the one with
most prefixes holds 3.5% of all the advertised IPv4 addresses.
Furthermore, in some PoS algorithms we can config-
ure the minimum number of participants needed to create a
monopoly, e.g. a participant needs to accumulate at least 75%
3https://iptoasn.com/
FIGURE 4. Percentage of IPv4 addresses of each RIR. Selected
countries/unions are also included in the corresponding RIR.
FIGURE 5. Transaction workflow example.
of the total stake in order to successfully perform an attack.
This way, we can adapt to the changing political situation of
the Internet, increasing this threshold if required (sec. VI-A,
PoS Consensus Algorithm).
V. ARCHITECTURE OF IPCHAIN
In this section we describe the architecture of IPchain regard-
ing workflow, intended deployment, PoS consensus algo-
rithm, and solutions to recover lost keys.
A. IP PREFIXES AS COINS
IP prefixes share some fundamental characteristics with the
coins or assets we find in any blockchain:
• They are unambiguously allocated to the participants.
• Can be transferred (delegated) between them.
• Can be divided up to a certain limit.
• Cannot be assigned to two participants at the same time.
Taking into account these similarities, we can devise a
blockchain to record and transfer IP prefixes, equivalently
to a financial blockchain. By chaining different transactions
we can replicate the allocation hierarchy of the RPKI in a
blockchain and create a consistent registry of owners of IP
prefixes. Figure 5 shows the intended deployment of such
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FIGURE 6. Sample usage scenario of IPchain.
blockchain: first, IANA, as the top-level regulator of Internet
numbers writes transactions assigning all the address space to
itself (1). Ideally, this first transaction is encoded in the gen-
esis block. Second, IANA transfers large blocks of addresses
to the RIRs (2). Third, the Registries allocate prefixes to
ISPs (3), which in turn delegate them to their customers (4).
Finally, customers bind metadata to their prefixes, such as
their AS number (5).
The genesis block contains all existing prefixes, so any
participant can download the blockchain, validate all the
transactions and determine the legitimate owner of a particu-
lar prefix.
B. OVERVIEW
Fig. 6 presents a sample of IPchain’s workflow. First, router
r1 writes in the chain its legitimate prefix and associated
AS number (1). Now, consider that the announcement prop-
agates through the network and is modified by the rough
router (center). When router r3 receives the announcement
of 150/8 to AS2, it can check in the blockchain (2) if
150/8 should be originated by AS2. In this case 150/8 should
be originated byAS1, so the announcement is deemed invalid.
It is worth noting that all the blockchain processes occur
offline (equivalently to the RPKI) in a standard server, so they
don’t need to be co-located with the router. Usually, the server
generates a list of valid (IP prefix, AS number) and sends it
to the BGP routers.
C. PoS CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
As mentioned in section IV-B, PoS fits the requirements of
our use-case. In this scenario, the selection of the next block
signer works in the following way:
1) Count the number of addresses of each participant
2) Generate a random number
3) Select one of the participants with the random number
weighted by their number of addresses
We must remark that the random number is generated
in a distributed fashion, i.e. participants exchange several
messages to create the same random number. This way, they
will also select the same signer. The key challenge in a PoS
algorithm is creating a publicly verifiable random number
in a distributed environment. We can find examples in the
literature on how to this, such as the Round-Robin Ran-
dom Number Generator [14] or the Shamir Secret Sharing
scheme [15]. Recently, new algorithms have been proposed
specifically designed for blockchains (sec. VIII), such as
Snow White [16] or Ouroboros [17].
Usually, PoW and PoS algorithms include some kind of
reward for new blocks, like Bitcoin, or a punishment for
(e.g. Ethereum Casper). In our scenario, we consider both
unnecessary: first, the reward is the security of the routing
infrastructure; apart from the fact that a PoS algorithm does
not require a significant financial investment. Second, in our
case a punishment would mean removing the IP addresses of
a participant, however, this is very unlikely in real life and can
have harsh consequences.
D. SUPPORTED OPERATIONS
We define the following operations for IPchain, that are
equivalent to those in the PRKI:
Allocate: Assign a block of IP prefixes to an entity, allow-
ing it to further allocate or delegate it to other entities.
Delegate: Like Allocate, but without the permission to
further allocate prefixes to other entities.
Metadata: Add additional data to a prefix, e.g. AS number
authorized to announce the prefix.
E. FLEXIBLE TRUST: REVOCATION
Blockchain transactions are irreversible, i.e. once we have
allocated an IP prefix to an entity, we cannot undo or modify
this transaction. Generally speaking, this is desirable from the
point of view of the ISPs, but there are some situations when it
is necessary to reclaim a block of addresses, e.g. stolen or lost
keys, human error, misuse, etc. In addition, IP addresses are
a finite good and must be preserved: the loss of an IP prefix
impacts the whole community, as opposed to a crypto-coin:
only its owner is affected.
Taking in to account that in a blockchain we can define
an arbitrary set of rules, we can design some schemes to
recover a block of addresses, but at the same time preserve the
decentralization in any blockchain. For instance, we can let a
widely recognized third party (e.g. IANA) resolve disputes
between conflicting parties by issuing a special transaction
that reallocates the resource. Other mechanisms are possible:
time-limited allocations, multi-signature transactions, etc.
Nevertheless, the revocation approach should be agreed
among the relevant players (IANA, RIRs, ISPs, institu-
tions, etc). It is worth noting that behind these mechanisms
there is a fundamental trade-off between complete central-
ization (traditional PKI, trust the upstream provider) and total
decentralization (blockchain).
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
We have built an open-source prototype and made it pub-
licly available4. We did not to fork an existing blockchain
4https://github.com/OpenOverlayRouter/blockchain-mapping-system
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FIGURE 7. IPchain prototype architecture.
implementation since they do not fit our needs, particularly
regarding the PoS consensus algorithm.
The IPchain prototype is written in Python (fig. 7),
supports common blockchain operations, and implements
the operations defined in section V-D for both IPv4 and
IPv6 addresses. With the aim to ease user interaction, the pro-
totype reads new transactions from a file, signs and sends
them to the network, and includes a keystore to encrypt the
user’s private keys.
In addition, the prototype interfaces via a local socket with
OpenOverlayRouter (OOR [18]). OOR is an open-source
implementation of the Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP,
RFC 6830) that creates programmable overlay network tun-
nels. OOR leverages IPchain to retrieve metadata related to
the IP prefixes that is used in some LISP signaling mes-
sages. In what follows, we describe relevant modules of the
prototype.
Data Structures: IPchain builds on Ethereum’s account
system, which maps pairs of blockchain addresses with the
associated IP addresses. Transactions are encoded as modifi-
cations to accounts. We chose this model instead of Bitcoin’s
UTXO because it requires less storage and data access is
easier. We modified the PyEthereum5 Trie, DB, Utils and
Transactions classes to fit our needs, and capped the block
size at 2 MB.
Peer-to-Peer Network: The P2P module implements all
communication functions in a broadcast-all fashion, leverag-
ing Pyhton’s Twisted6 library for network communication.
Since it does not connect all the nodes between themselves,
a Distributed Hash Table7 keeps track of the last block num-
ber, so that if a node misses some blocks it can request them.
A. PoS CONSENSUS ALGORITHM
We have leveraged part of the DFINITY blockchain PoS
algorithm for our chain [19]. This chain operates a complex
three-step algorithm that combines a Decentralized Random
Number Generator (DRNG), a block notarization process
and a finalization process. The two latter are used to resolve
chain forks and achieve higher scalability. For simplicity, our
prototype only uses the DRNG and does not tolerate chain
forks.
5https://github.com/ethereum/pyethereum
6https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/
7https://github.com/cliftonm/kademlia-1
FIGURE 8. DKG (top) and BLS (bottom) operation.
The DRNG builds on the well-know topic of threshold
signatures (fig. 8), in which a group of participants jointly
generate a group key and a set of private keys, known as
Distributed Key Generation (DKG). Later, they can use these
private keys to sign a message; however, the signature is only
valid if a portion of the participants (defined by a tunable
parameter, the Threshold) have signed the message. The
scheme we use there is the Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS). The
message is commonly know as share because it is a part of
the whole signature.
In the blockchain context, we calculate the random number
as the hash of the signedmessage (n.b. all participants sign the
same message). Due to the fact that we cannot recover the
signed message unless Threshold participants have signed it,
we can be sure no single participant can manipulate this num-
ber. We repeat this process for each new block to get a fresh
random number to select the next block signer. In addition,
the Threshold signature scheme offers two key advantages:
(i) since it is not necessary that all the participants sign the
message, we can tolerate several malicious or disconnected
nodes, and (ii) we can adjust the Threshold to tune the upper
limit of malicious or disconnected participants depending on
the current situation, as we mentioned in sec. IV-C.
Finally, our prototype also: (i) repeats the private key gen-
eration process after a predetermined number of blocks to
refresh the public and private keys, and to take into account
new participants that have been added in previous blocks,
and (ii) in order to scale more easily, not all blockchain
addresses take part in the DRNG, we select some of them
with the previously generated random number.
VII. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We carried out several experiments in order to determine
the applicability of IPchain in real life. We measured several
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FIGURE 9. Number of transactions in each block and block time. We can see the non-uniform distribution of v4 and v6 transactions especially after block
2000.
blockchain metrics to characterize the performance and scal-
ability of IPchain, focusing on six keymetrics: (i) throughput,
(ii) block time, (iii) bootstrap time, (iv) chain size, (v) block
time depending on BLS threshold, and (vi) DKG refresh time.
Finally, we present an analytical estimation of the required
storage in the long-term.
A. BLOCKCHAIN METRICS
Throughput: For this test, we encoded in the genesis block
the entire v4 and v6 address space (splitting them in large
blocks of addresses, similarly to IANA’s registries of v4 and
v6 address space8). In order to simulate the typical allocation
scheme of IP prefixes, we generated three groups of trans-
actions. The first one referenced prefixes in the genesis block
and split them uniformly into smaller prefixes, and the second
also created smaller prefixes but referencing the transactions
from the first group. Finally, we extracted the prefixes for
the third level directly from the publicly available lists of the
Registries’ address allocations9, with the final goal of storing
real prefixes in the chain. In total, we generated around 380k
transactions (82k in levels 1 and 2, 298k in level 3 - two thirds
of the 430k in the RIR files).
We set up a single node (VM with two associated virtual
CPUs, Intel Xeon Platinum @ 3 GHz, 4 GB RAM) with
these transactions, all the associated keys and a configured
DKG with 100 keys and 66% BLS Threshold, 40s block
time and 2 MB block size. We can see the result of this
experiment in fig. 9, which plots the number of transactions
per block, separated into v4 and v6 transactions. We can
see two distinct phases in the experiment: before and after
block ∼1580. In this moment we increased the transaction
injection speed from 1tx/s to 10tx/s. Indeed, we can see that
8https://www.iana.org/numbers
9https://www.nro.net/statistics/
the number of transactions per block increases from 25 to 150,
approximately.
During the whole test, and especially after block 2000,
we observe a high variability in the number of transactions per
block, roughly spanning from 100 to 250 transactions. This is
due to the non-uniform distribution of v4 and v6 transactions
in the input file: the proportion of v4 and v6 transactions
is not constant for the entire file. Since the node processed
transactions at a fixed speed, regardless if they were v4 or v6,
in a given period of time a we may not inject a constant
number of v4 or v6 transactions.We can also notice this in the
reduction of v4 transactions when the number of v6 increases,
and viceversa.
The maximum number of transactions per block revolves
around 400, so we can estimate IPchain’s throughput to be
approximately 10 transactions per second, in the same order
of magnitude of Bitcoin. If we consider that average of num-
ber of BGP updates is between 10-15 per second [12], and
that our system targets a subset of those, we can conclude that
IPchain presents sufficient throughput for this application.
Blocktime: In order to verify the correct operation of the
prototype, fig. 9 presents the time between each consecutive
block in the right y axis. We can see that in nearly all cases
it remains in the configured interval of 40 seconds, since we
automatically trigger the block creation just after 40s from
the timestamp of the last block. In some cases, due to data
processing delays it reaches 41s.
Bootstrap test:With the aim of quantifying IPchain’s cost
in terms of time and compute resources, we performed a
bootstrap test, i.e. adding a new node to the network and
measure: (i) time to validate all the chain, and (ii) total chain
storage. We must note that the time to download the blocks
is negligible compared to the validation time. We used a
VM with two associated virtual CPUs (Intel Xeon Platinum
@ 3 GHz) and 4 GB RAM. It took 3.5 hours to verify
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FIGURE 10. Minimum block time depending on BLS Threshold setup.
the chain, that contained 350k prefixes and required 2.5 GB
of storage. This last metric lets us conclude that the chain can
scale well in terms of storage for this scenario.
B. CRYPTOGRAPHY METRICS
Block time depending on BLS threshold: In this test we
aim to calculate the minimum block time depending on the
BLS threshold setup, which in turn determines the chain
throughput. We define the minimum block time as the time
it takes to generate the BLS shares, send them to the network,
recover the group signature, calculate the random number and
create an empty block. Fig. 10 presents the average of this
time for 100 blocks for different threshold values. We set up
10 nodes in a cloud provider, each in a different region of
the world, and VMs with two virtual CPUs, Intel Xeon @
2.5 GHz, 4GB RAM. The nodes exchanged BLS shares, with
10 blockchain addresses for each (100 participants in the BLS
in total). As we can see, the minimum block time revolves
around 6.15 seconds regardless of the Threshold setup. Two
main reasons explain this phenomenon: (i) the operation that
joins the BLS shares is not computationally intensive, and (ii)
the share size is too small (each share weights approximately
60 bytes) to cause an increase in the communication delay, i.e.
the delay does not increase significantly if we send 80 shares
instead of 20 across the network. These results suggest that
the BLS Threshold does note have a noticeable impact on
performance.
DKG keys renewal time: Finally, we measured how long
it took to perform a key refresh depending on the number of
nodes. We used the same cloud nodes than in the previous
experiment. Fig. 11 presents a linear interpolation of data
from three experiments. We can see that the delay grows
linearly with the number of nodes, basically because in this
process: (i) each node has to send a message to the rest,
and (ii) the crytographic function to generate the group key is
more costly than the one that joins the BLS shares.
C. LONG-TERM STORAGE ESTIMATION
We performed a storage estimation in order to evaluate
IPchain’s long-term feasibility. We estimated separately the
FIGURE 11. Delay to create private keys.
FIGURE 12. 20-year storage estimation for IPchain.
number of IP prefix allocations and AS-to-prefix bind-
ings, and made the following assumptions. For the pre-
fix allocation, transactions of 500 bytes, an initial load
of the current 600k prefixes in the BGP RIB table, plus
re-allocating all BGP prefixes each year, and a growth in
new prefixes exponentially adjusted to the BGP RIB table
growth [20]. Regarding the bindings of AS numbers to pre-
fixes, we assumed one AS-to-prefix binding for each block
in all the /24 IPv4 address space, each transaction weights
around 400 bytes, and an update rate similar to the BGP
churn [21], increasing linearly each year.
Figure 12 presents the estimation for both AS numbers
and IP prefixes, their sum, and a comparison with Bitcoin,
assuming it starts in 2019, keeps the 0.5 MB block size,
the rate of 1 block each 10 min, and all blocks are full. We can
see that prefixes account for a reduced part of the transactions
when compared to AS bindings; this is due to the continuous
increase in the churn and the number of bindings. Neverthe-
less, in 20 years’ time the chain accounts for approximately
600 GB, a figure that is easily attainable by current storage
systems. Finally, we can see that in this 20-year interval,
we stay below the requirements of Bitcoin, which supports
our thesis that a blockchain for IP addresses has moderate
storage requirements in the long term.
VIII. RELATED WORK
A. BLOCKCHAIN APPLICATIONS FOR NETWORKING
Several blockchain applications oriented for networks have
been proposed [22], such as the Internet of Things [23],
BGP messages [24], Information Centric Networking [25]
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or distributed access control [26], [27]. However, the largest
body of work focuses on providing naming applications with
similar functions to the DNS: Namecoin10, Blockstack [28],
Ethereum Name System11, etc. To the best of our knowledge,
IPchain is the first blockchain specifically tailored for the
allocation and delegation of IP addresses.
The most closely related work is [29], which advocates
for an automatic IP prefix distribution system on top of an
Hyperledger private blockchain, while in our proposal we
maintain the manual allocation of IANA and RIRs and we
use PoS instead of Hyperledger’s certificate-based system.
Other similar works focus on embedding also BGP path
announcements in the blockchain [30], or deploying an IP
allocation system as a smart contract in Ethereum [31], but
neither of them focus on the benefits of PoS algorithms.
B. PoS CONSENSUS ALGORITHMS
We can find several PoS algorithms already in production sys-
tems, such as NEM’s Proof of Importance [32] or Ethereum
Capser. Proof of Importance is a PoS variant that takes into
consideration, apart from the stake, the dynamics of the trans-
actions (topology, frequency). Due to this, we don’t find this
algorithm suitable for IPchain, because our situation is not as
rapidly evolving as in the NEM chain.
Regarding Ethereum Casper, we found that its punishment
mechanism is not suitable for our use case (sec. V-C). Other
proposed algorithms, like Algorand [33] or Ouroboros [17],
are a good fit, but we were unable to find an open-source
implementation.
C. SOCIAL NETWORK CONSENSUS ALGORITHMS
These kind of algorithms, such as Stellar [34], are based on
a user’s trust relationships with other users. In other words,
users define a list of trusted nodes, and only consider transac-
tions validated by them. Regarding our use-case, we consider
that they are a promising alternative. However, since they
commonly require an identification based on digital certifi-
cates, we would lose the aforementioned advantages related
to simplified management.
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have introduced IPchain, a Proof of Stake
blockchain to store the allocation and delegation of IP
addresses. We have discussed its benefits over existing sys-
tems, both in the policy side and the technical side. On the pol-
icy side, we argue that the decentralization of blockcahins can
mitigate the centralization concerns of current systems, offer-
ing an alternative to distribute trust among all its participants.
With respect to the technical issues, we have considered how
a blockchain can ease management or offer auditabilty when
compared to current solutions. Moreover, we have empha-
sized the advantages of a Proof of Stake consensus algorithm
for our specific use case. In the end, we have evaluated the
performance of our prototype storing Internet Registry data,
10https://namecoin.org/
11https://ens.domains/
and demonstrated that it can achieve the requirements for
real-world deployments regarding throughput and long-term
storage.
Possible future work revolves around adding all or part
of the BGP AS-path in IPchain, so that BGP routers have
additional data to verify BGP messages. Specifically, it is
worth investigating how to ensure that only authorised neigh-
bouring ASes can append a new ASN, and a scalability
analysis for this new data, because the churn, throughput,
and storage requirements are significantly higher. Indeed,
this means storing all the active Internet BGP routes in the
blockchain. On the performance side, it is worth investigating
data structures for efficient management of IP prefixes in the
chain (split / merge operations), and a detailed analysis on the
PoS protocol scalability, e.g. how does the DKG group size
affect security and block time. Finally, since IPchain does not
tolerate forks, we need a reliable mechanism to select a new
signer if the original one is offline or malicious.
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